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III. 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal results from a dispute over insurance 
coverage. The appellant, Kirk H. Mower, a self-employed truck 
driver, is appealing two summary judgments. The first summary 
judgment dismissed his claims against Lynn Transportation Company, 
Inc. ("Lynn11 or "Lynn Transportation") and Alexander & Alexander, 
Inc. ("A&A") for failure to procure and provide Worker's 
Compensation Insurance. The lower court dismissed Mower's breach 
of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud 
claims. The second summary judgment awarded Lynn Transportation 
$34,398.52 in attorney's fees and costs as a result of the lower 
court's interpretation of a contractual indemnification provision. 
In his opening brief, Mower identified ten (10) issues on 
appeal. The issues focus on (1) whether there is an integrated 
contract, or whether issues of fact must be resolved prior to 
determining the integration issue (Issues 1, 2 and 10); (2) whether 
the lower court correctly applied the parol evidence rule (Issues 
3 and 4); (3) whether equitable estoppel requires reversal of the 
summary judgment (Issues 5 and 9); (4) contract interpretation 
(Issues 6 and 8); and (5) statutory construction (Issue 7). 
In his opening brief, Mower showed that the first summary 
judgment must be reversed because there are issues of material fact 
1 
that must be resolved before a court can conclude that the written 
agreement, absent the insurance order form, is an integrated 
contract. (Appellants1 brief, pp. 19-22.) Mower also showed that 
the court misapplied the parol evidence rule because the rule does 
not bar claims based upon negligence or misrepresentation. 
Further, the rule cannot bar claims against a defendant that is not 
a party to the integrated contract. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-
27) . 
Mower also explained that there are material issues of 
fact which must be resolved before the court can determine whether 
Lynn Transportation is estopped from denying its promise to obtain 
worker's compensation insurance for Mower and whether Lynn 
Transportation is estopped from seeking attorney's fees under its 
form agreement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29, 35-38). In 
addition, Mower showed that the Mower/Lynn Transportation 
indemnification clause, when strictly construed, does not apply and 
the summary judgment awarding attorney's fees must be vacated. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34). 
Finally, Mower showed that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3) (a) 
an Industrial Commission notice provision is no defense to Mower's 
claims and does not justify the lower court's summary judgment. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 30-31). 
In its responding brief, appellee, Lynn Transportation, 
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Inc. argues that Mower did not contest the issue of contract 
integration in the lower court. Lynn also says there is no 
material fact issue requiring resolution prior to the lower court's 
conclusion that the Mower/Lynn agreement, absent the insurance 
application, was an integrated contract. (Lynn's brief, pp. 10-
12.) 
From the foregoing conclusory argument, Lynn says that 
the parol evidence rule bars evidence that the Lynn-provided 
insurance order form and the statements of Lynn's employees that 
Lynn would obtain worker's compensation insurance for Mower, were 
a part of the contract. (Lynn's brief, pp 13-14.) In addition, 
Lynn says that estoppel is unavailable to Mower as a matter of law, 
because Mower could not have reasonably relied on Lynn's statements 
and actions. Lynn also argues that the promises made by Lynn's 
employees are not sufficiently definite and certain. Moreover, 
Lynn says that Mower was not without fault so equitable estoppel is 
inapplicable. (Lynn's brief, pp. 15-24.) 
Lynn Transportation also argues that Mower can only sue 
in contract, not tort. It says "the agreement controls and Mower's 
remedies are limited to rights evidenced by the contract" (Lynn's 
brief, p.25). In making its argument, Lynn characterizes Mower's 
damages as "purely economic, rather than direct damages for his 
physical injuries." (Lynn's brief, at 27). 
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In addition, Lynn argues that, because Mower did not 
notify the Industrial Commission that he wanted the Worker's 
Compensation Act to apply to him, Mower could not have obtained 
benefits, even if Lynn had procured the insurance for Mower. 
(Lynnfs brief, pp. 29-33). Finally, Lynn argues that the injury in 
this case results out of the performance of the Mower/Lynn 
agreement, so the Utah court properly entered summary judgment in 
favor of Lynn on the contract indemnification clause. (Lynn's 
brief, pp. 34-36). 
Appellee, A&A also filed a responding brief. In its 
brief, A&A says the summary judgment entered in its favor was 
correct because Mower failed to present evidence of breach of 
contract, negligence, fraud or misrepresentation by A&A. (A&A's 
brief, p. 10) . More specifically, A&A says that the insurance 
order form did not create a contract to procure insurance because 
allegedly Mower did not present any evidence of mutual consent. 
(A&Afs brief, pp. 11-12). A&A also argues that Mower failed to 
show that A&A had a duty to procure the worker's compensation 
insurance. 
In addition, A&A argues that it had no contract with 
Mower, and A&A was not a party to the Mower/Lynn agreement, so it 
cannot be held liable under any misrepresentation theory. A&A 
protests that it did not make any affirmative representation, false 
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or otherwise, to Mower, (A&A's brief, pp. 17-19). Moreover, A&A 
argues that estoppel cannot apply to this case because A&A was not 
a party to the agreement. A&A also contends that Mower "can 
forward no evidence that he relied on any representation, act or 
omission of A&A." (A&Afs brief, p. 21). 
Finally, A&A says that § 31A-1-43 bars Mower's claims 
because in this case, contrary to the facts in Garrett v. Garrett. 
249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. App. 1978), A&A did not recover any premiums 
or other benefit whereby estoppel could be justified. In their 
briefs, both appellees also improperly attempt to set forth the 
facts and inferences supported by the record in the light most 
favorable to them, rather than in a light favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. This reply brief responds to the 
arguments raised by both Lynn Transportation and A&A and their 
improper recitation of the facts. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE MOWER/LYNN FORM CONTRACT WAS 
AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT OR WHETHER THE FORM 
CONTRACT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER WITH THE 
LYNN PROVIDED INSURANCE FORM AND/OR THE CONTEMPORANEOUS 
STATEMENTS OF LYNNfS EMPLOYEES, WAS AN ISSUE RAISED 
BY THE PARTIES AND CONSIDERED IN THE LOWER COURT. 
A. Appellees f Briefs: 
Lynn Transportation says that Mower raised no argument 
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and pointed to no fact concerning the written agreement's 
integration, so this court should not consider Mower's argument 
that the first summary judgment should be reversed because issues 
of fact exist regarding the contract's integration. (Lynn's brief, 
p. 10). 
B. Discussion: 
It is simply not true that "Mower raised no argument and 
pointed to no fact, concerning the written agreement's integration" 
as alleged at p. 10 of Lynn's brief. The fact Mower agreed by 
contract to obtain insurance does not preclude his claim that he 
satisfied this duty by ordering insurance through defendants. Both 
parties raised and contested the contract integration issue. In 
defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judgment on the plaintiff's 
claim, Lynn and A&A argued that the issues in this case, should be 
dealt with using traditional notions of the parol evidence rule and 
the function of integration clauses within contracts. (R. 395) . 
Subsequently, Mower responded in his "Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment" that as part of the 
hiring process, Lynn provided the insurance order form together 
with the contract and that Lynn's employees told him that "he could 
obtain all necessary insurance through Lynn Transportation and 
Alexander & Alexander." Mower explained that both his contract 
with Lynn and the insurance order form were signed 
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contemporaneously as part of one transaction wherein Mower became 
employed as an independent contractor for Lynn. (R. 465-68). 
Subsequently in his memo, Mower argued that disputed facts which 
preclude summary judgment in his case include, "the effect of the 
order form." (R. 475), If there was any question that the issue 
of integration was contested, and there is not, that question was 
resolved in paragraph 2 of the Order granting Summary Judgment. 
2. The Court determines that the contract 
between Lynn Transportation and plaintiff 
Mower* . . is an integrated contract. (R. 
566) . 
In summary, all parties raised the contract integration 
issue and the court ruled on the issue. That is all that is 
required to preserve the integration issue for appeal. See e.g. 
LaBaron Associates v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 
App. 1991). (To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, party 
must. . . bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus 
providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits.) 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE MOWER/LYNN FORM AGREEMENT 
IS A COMPLETE INTEGRATED CONTRACT PRESENTS 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REQUIRING 
A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Appellees f Briefs: 
Lynn Transportation, in its brief, argues that the 
following clause: "This agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
and understanding between the parties. . ."is conclusive proof 
that the parties1 written agreement, absent the insurance 
application, was an integrated contract. Lynn also pleads that "to 
rely on conduct extrinsic to the contract's clear written terms to 
impose a contract duty upon Lynn is to ignore the express terms of 
the parties1 contract as well as Mower's repeated admission of that 
contractual duty [to obtain worker's compensation insurance]." 
(Lynn's brief, p. 12). 
B. Discussion: 
Lynn's argument that the form contract is an integrated 
contract because the contract says so, is not dispositive. As set 
forth on p. 2 0 of Mower's opening brief, whether the parties adopt 
a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of their 
bargain is a question of fact. Moreover, parol evidence is used 
(not just the integration clause) to resolve the integration 
question. E.g. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663, 665 (Utah 
1985) . 
In contesting summary judgment, Mower showed by attached 
affidavits that at the time he signed the Mower/Lynn form contract, 
he also signed the insurance order form provided by Lynn and A&A. 
He was also told that Lynn would deduct insurance premium money 
from checks paid to Mower, which Lynn did. From the foregoing, 
Mower believed that he had complied with his duty under the 
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contract by ordering insurance through Lynn and A&A. Further, by 
supplemented affidavit of Jerry Anderegg1, Mower showed that Lynn 
and A&A had an obligation to purchase the insurance ordered by 
Mower or to notify him that the insurance was unavailable (R. 536, 
491 at f 6 , 7). By supplemented affidavit of Anderegg, Mower also 
showed that his belief that he had worker's compensation insurance 
was reasonable. (R. 536, 491 at 5 9) . Moreover, in appellee's 
Memoranda in Support of the Summary Judgment, Lynn and A&A each 
admitted that Lynn provided the A&A insurance order form to Mower 
contemporaneously with the Mower/Lynn form agreement. They also 
admit that Lynn told Mower that Lynn would order the insurance from 
A&A and compute Mower's premiums. (R. 398-401). The foregoing is 
sufficient evidence to show that the Mower/Lynn form contract was 
not a complete integrated contract. Instead, the two related 
agreements should have been construed together. C. f. Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972) (trial court did 
not err in following the rule of law that when two or more 
1
 At page 7 and f.n. 2 of its brief, Lynn notes the court 
granted its Motion to Strike the "Anderegg Affidavit" and claims 
this was not appealed. The Order granting summary judgment which 
is on appeal here also granted the Motion to Strike so that issue 
is in fact on appeal. However, the supplemental affidavit of Jerry 
Anderegg was filed after the Motion to Strike and was never subject 
to the motion. It should be noted the supplemental affidavit 
corrected the deficiencies claimed to exist in the motions which 
were subject to the Motion to Strike. The supplemental affidavit, 
after setting out proper foundation related all opinions given in 
the previous affidavits. See R. 536-540. 
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instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or 
at different times in the course of the same transaction, and 
concern the same subject matter, they will be read and construed 
together. . . although they do not in terms refer to each other). 
POINT III 
WHETHER MOWER REASONABLY RELIED 
ON LYNN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS AND WHETHER 
THE PROMISES MADE BY LYNN WERE SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE 
ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REQUIRING 
A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Appellees f Briefs: 
In its brief, Lynn says that as a matter of law, Mower 
couldn't have relied on its employees1 misrepresentations because 
"Mower does not testify that Granath [Lynn's employee] ever said 
she would obtain such [worker's compensation] insurance; that 
Granath never committed to do anything more than faxing the form 
with his [Mower's] 'X' on it". Further, Lynn says that Mower never 
received a rider or any other indication that his insurance was in 
effect, and he never saw a calculation of premium." Lynn also says 
that, Mower cannot rely on a statement contrary to the form 
contract".2 (Lynn's brief, pp. 16-21). Finally, Lynn says its 
2
 There is not in fact any "contrary statement" to the form 
contract. The contract merely required Mower to obtain insurance. 
Mower, in good faith, tried to do so in the manner suggested by 
Lynn itself. See opening Brief at pp. 6-11. Nothing in or about 
the contract touches in any way on the manner in which insurance 
was to be obtained. Since the contract did not control the method 
of obtaining insurance, it is not contrary to the terms of the 
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employees1 promises were indefinite so Mower could not possibly 
have relied on them. (Lynn's brief, p. 24). This is a claim for 
the jury to decide. Lynn also argues that Mower was not without 
fault. This is another factual issue. 
B. Discussion: 
The first problem with Lynn's argument is that the 
question of reasonable reliance is a factual issue to be resolved 
by the jury. C.f. Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 754 P.2d 
1222 (Utah 1988). Reliance is a fact issue. It is not an "as a 
matter of law issue". Lynn does an excellent job in taking 
snippets from the record to support its no reasonable reliance 
argument. However, it omits an abundance of evidence showing that 
Lynn's representations were definite and the Mower reasonably 
relied on them. A brief summary of such evidence follows: 
1. After presenting Mower with the form contract, Lynn 
directed him to Linda Murray (Granath) to discuss and obtain 
insurance. (R. 398, 427, 466.). 
2. Lynn's employees specifically told Mower that Lynn 
could order worker's compensation insurance cheaper than he could 
get it himself and money would be withheld from his checks to pay 
for the insurance. R. 427, 466, 486-89 (Mower Affidavit). 
contract to claim Lynn agreed to effect the insurance through A&A 
on Mower's behalf. 
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3. Mower was a former Lynn employee, knew Linda, and 
knew that Linda's job was to obtain insurance for Lynn's employees. 
4. Linda presented A&A's order form to Mower and told 
him that Lynn would compute the premiums for whatever insurance he 
ordered and would deduct them from Mower's checks. Lynn did deduct 
insurance premiums from Mower's checks. R. 486-89. 
5. Mower requested worker's compensation, bobtail and 
liability insurance by using the A&A form supplied by Lynn. 
Bobtail and liability insurance were obtained, worker's 
compensation insurance was not obtained. R. 477. 
6. Neither Lynn nor A&A ever told Mower that they had 
not obtained worker's compensation coverage for Mower along with 
his other insurance. R. 173, 175, 178, 466. 
7. An expert witness testified, that under the 
foregoing circumstances, Mower's belief that he had worker's 
compensation insurance was reasonable. R. 490-93. 
All of the above, though briefly summarized, shows that 
whether Mower reasonably relied on Lynn's misrepresentations is a 
fact issue requiring a reversal of the summary judgment. 
A second problem with Lynn's argument is that contrary to 
the unsupported assertions in their brief, the statements made by 
Lynn's employees were not contrary to the form Mower/Lynn 
agreement. See f .n. 1, supra. The form contract requires Mower to 
12 
obtain worker's compensation insurance but it does not specify how 
such coverage was to be obtained. Lynn told Mower that coverage 
could be obtained through A&A with payment to be made by deductions 
by Lynn from Mower's checks. Such deductions were, in fact, made. 
That representation does not directly or indirectly contradict the 
Mower/Lynn form agreement. In fact, it shows attempted compliance 
by Mower. It simply provides one way that Mower could obtain 
worker's compensation insurance to satisfy his contract with Lynn. 
POINT IV 
THE FORM MOWER/LYNN CONTRACT DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE MOWER FROM SUING LYNN FOR 
NEGLIGENCE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
AND FRAUD. 
A. Appellees' Briefs: 
Lynn says that because the contract executed by and 
between Mower and Lynn defines the duty regarding the acquisition 
of Worker's Compensation insurance, Mower's alleged causes of 
action may only sound in contract. (Lynn's brief at 25). Lynn 
also says that since Mower's claim is for purely economic loss, 
only such losses are recoverable under a contract claim. (Lynn's 
brief, pp. 27, 28 and f.n. 9). 
B. Discussion. 
Lynn and A&A's liability to Mower springs from three 
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sources: (1) Lynn's oral or contract promise to obtain insurance3; 
(2) Lynn's misrepresentation that Lynn could obtain worker's 
compensation insurance from A&A; and, (3) A&A and Lynn's negligent 
performance of the insurance broker duties4. Thus, when Lynn and 
A&A failed to obtain the worker's compensation insurance or notify 
Mower that coverage was not available, they became subject to suit 
under theories of breach of contract, negligence and fraud. E.g. 
Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Oregon, Inc., 607 
P.2d 763 (Or. App. 1980) (breach of contract, negligence); Magic 
Valley Potato Shippers v. Continental Insurance, 739 P.2d 372 
(Idaho 1987) (fraud); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, 
Inc., 739 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1987) (negligence); Clary Insurance 
Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980) (negligence). C.f. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-102(2) (binding oral contracts may be made 
as to worker's compensation insurance) ; §31A-23-302(1) (a) (i) 
(unfair marketing practice to make any communication which contains 
3
 As set forth in Point VII of this Brief, A&A is vicariously 
liable for Lynn's promises and misrepresentations. An oral promise 
to procure insurance is enforceable. C.f. Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-
102(2) (buying oral contracts of insurance may. . . be made. . .as 
to worker's compensation insurance. . . . ) . 
4
 An insurance broker is a person or entity who acts in 
procuring insurance on behalf of the applicant. Utah Code Ann. 
§§31A-1-301(43) ; 31A-23-102(1) (b) (whether a person or entity acts 
as an agent for the applicant is a question of fact precluding 
summary judgment) Van Per Heyde v. First Colony Life Insurance 
Company, 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1993); Vina v. Jefferson Insurance 
Company of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988) • 
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false or misleading information relating to an insurance contract 
including information which is false or misleading because it is 
incomplete). 
POINT V 
SIMPLY BECAUSE A&A DID NOT SIGN THE MOWER/LYNN 
FORM AGREEMENT, DOES NOT BAR MOWER'S 
CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS AGAINST A&A. 
A. A&Afs Brief: 
A&A says that since Mower admits that A&A was not a party 
to the Mower/Lynn form agreement, Lynn was not acting as A&A's 
agent so Mower can't sue A&A for breach of contract or for any 
misrepresentations made to Lynn. A&A also said it is undisputed 
that Lynn is not an insurance agent or broker so A&A has no 
vicarious liability for Lynn's misrepresentations. (A&A's Brief, 
pp. 9-10, 16-20). 
B. Discussion: 
Lynn was A&A's agent or at least a jury could conclude 
that Lynn was A&A's agent. See Opening Brief pp, 6-9. An agent is 
one who acts for another. There is ample evidence that Lynn acted 
for A&A to solicit insurance orders. See generally pp 6-9 of 
Appellant's Opening Brief. For example, Lynn told Mower it would 
obtain insurance for him through A&A (R. 427, 466). The order form 
given to Mower was prepared by A&A (R. 396, 418, 477). A&A is a 
broker (R. 297-98, 318, 337). A&A has no Utah office but provides 
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order forms to Lynn (R. 178, 183, 299, 336, 467-68). From the 
above, a jury could conclude that Lynn was A&A's agent. Thus, 
A&A's claim that it should not be vicariously liable, does not 
justify the lower court's summary judgment. 
POINT VI 
UTAH CODE ANN. S31A-1-43f3)fa) DOES 
NOT BAR MOWERS CLAIMS AGAINST 
LYNN TRANSPORTATION AND A&A. 
A. Appellees' Briefs: 
Lynn says that even if it had obtained the ordered 
worker's compensation insurance, that Mower would not have received 
benefits because Mower did not notify the Industrial Commission as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-l-43(3)(a). In effect, Lynn says 
that Mower was not damaged by Lynn's misconduct but by Mower's 
failure in filing the notice. 
B. Discussion: 
Neither Lynn Transportation nor A&A cite any case law for 
their unsupported notion that notice provisions like Utah Code Ann. 
§31-1-43(a) bar claims for worker's compensation coverage. Just 
the opposite is true. In the only reported case, the parties have 
discovered, Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. App. 1978), 
the court held that the insurance carrier was estopped from using 
a similar statute as a defence to a demand for worker's 
compensation coverage. If Lynn and A&A are estopped from using 
16 
Utah Code Ann. §31-1-43 (3) (a) , then their failure to obtain 
coverage results in damage. 
The supplemental affidavit of Jerry Anderegg (R. 536-540) 
explains that compliance with §31A-l-43(3)(a) is normally 
undertaken by the agent (A&A) on behalf of the client. Anderegg 
further testified the agent or broker (Lynn/A&A) has a duty to 
inform the client about the requirements of §31A-l-43(3)(a) and 
failure to do so breaches their duty to the client. Id. 
POINT VII 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE 
OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR MISREPRESENTATION 
BY A&A WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT. 
MOREOVER, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF BREACH 
OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE AND MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. A&Afs Brief: 
In its brief, A&A argues that plaintiff failed to show 
material evidence of breach of contract, negligence, fraud or 
misrepresentation by A&A in the lower court (A&A Brief at 10-14). 
B. Discussion: 
A&A has apparently misapprehended Mower's argument on the 
parol evidence rule. In a nutshell, plaintiff asserts that since 
A&A was not a party to the driving contract between Lynn and Mower, 
it cannot avail itself of legal rules related to an integrated 
contract to avoid liability for its own acts of breach of contract, 
negligence, fraud or misrepresentation. See Opening Brief at 24-
17 
27. 
Taken in the light most favorable to Mower rwinegar v. 
Froerer Corp. , 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991)]. The facts set out in 
Appellants' Opening Brief show: 
1. Mower was required to obtain worker's compensation 
insurance R. 172, 181. 
2. Mower was given an A&A form by Lynn and told Lynn 
would get insurance for him through A&A and would deduct premiums 
from his settlement check. R. 396, 418, 427, 466, 477. 
3. Mower used the A&A form to order insurance and 
checked the box to order worker's compensation insurance. R. 477, 
486-87; Kirk Mower Depo. p. 113. 
4. Mower was justified in believing he had obtained 
insurance from A&A. See Anderegg Affidavit f 9, R. 483-84. 
A&A argues there was no mutual assent. Yet a jury could 
easily find the A&A form to be an offer to procure the listed 
coverages which was accepted by Mower when he checked the boxes and 
caused the form to be delivered to A&A. In fact, the procuring by 
A&A of bobtail and liability coverage pursuant to the order form 
creates a past performance which in itself shows mutual assent to 
the contract. The fact that A&A provided two of the three 
coverages listed on its order form, and collected premiums 
therefore, without obtaining worker's compensation insurance or 
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informing Mower it was not doing so, creates evidence of a failure 
by A&A to do its duty to provide insurance to Mower. See Anderegg 
Affidavits at R. 483, 536. Such conduct provides a clear basis for 
recovery. E.g. Fiorentino v. Travelers Insurance Company, 448 F. 
Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978); State Farm Insurance Company v. Fort 
Wayne National Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1985); Clary 
Insurance Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980). 
POINT VIII 
THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE CANNOT BE APPLIED 
TO MOWER'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THE CLAIMS DO NOT RESULT 
FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FORM AGREEMENT. 
A. Lynn's Brief: 
In its brief, Lynn argues that Mower's claim results from 
the performance of the form agreement because "it is undisputed 
that Mower's injury occurred while he was performing this 
agreement." It also says that it is clear from the parties form 
agreement that the parties intended Mower to assume the 
responsibility of complying with the Worker's Compensation law so 
the indemnification clause must apply. (Lynn's brief at 35). 
B. Discussion: 
Mower's injuries, for which damages are sought herein, 
occurred because worker's compensation insurance was not in force 
at the time of his accident. Had there been an extant worker's 
compensation policy, Mower would have no claimed injuries. 
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Mower's injuries thus occurred as a result of the failure 
of Lynn and A&A to perform a separate, though related, 
contemporaneous agreement. That the agreement arose from an 
attempt by Mower to comply with his duty under the Lynn agreement 
to obtain insurance should not and in fact does not implicate that 
agreement which contains the indemnification. 
POINT IX 
A&A IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
LYNN'S MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. A&A's Brief: 
A&A claims it is not liable to Mower because A&A was not 
a signatory to the Mower/Lynn form contract. A&A's Brief at 11-14. 
A&A also says it had no communication with Mower so it cannot be 
found liable for fraud or misrepresentation. A&A's Brief pp. 16-
22. 
B. Discussion: 
A&A's liability to Mower does not depend on whether A&A 
was a signatory to the Mower/Lynn form contract. Rather, A&A's 
liability springs from its action as an insurance broker. A&A is 
an insurance broker. (R. 297-98, 318, 337). An insurance broker 
is an entity or person who acts in procuring insurance on behalf of 
an applicant. Utah Code Ann. §§31A-1-301(43); §31A-23-102(1)(b). 
However, A&A did not maintain an office in Utah. Instead, it did 
business by providing to Lynn Transportation insurance order forms 
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to be used by Lynn's truck drivers to order insurance (R. 178, 183, 
299,336,467-68). Lynn would process the forms for A&A and Lynn's 
truck drivers. The form supplied to Mower with check-off spaces to 
order worker's compensation coverage is a representation (written) 
that (1) A&A sells worker's compensation insurance; and (2) 
worker's compensation insurance can be obtained by checking the 
appropriate box on the form. From the foregoing, a jury could 
easily conclude that Lynn was an agent of A&A and that A&A and Lynn 
acted as an insurance broker for Mower. Misrepresentations were 
made by A&A. The issue of whether an agent is an agent of the 
applicant or the insured, is a question of fact, precluding summary 
judgment. See Van Per Hevde v. First Colony Life Insurance 
Company, 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1993) ; Vina v. Jefferson Insurance 
Company of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988). 
Essentially, if the jury finds that Lynn and A&A acted as 
an insurance broker for Mower, the jury can hold Lynn and A&A 
liable for failure to obtain insurance or to notify Mower that 
insurance was not available under theories of breach of contract, 
negligence and/or fraud. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's opening brief identified numerous issues of 
material fact requiring reversal of the two summary judgments. 
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Further, none of the reasons advanced by Lynn Transportation and 
Alexander & Alexander justify the lower court's summary judgments. 
For these reasons, the summary judgments should be vacated and the 
case remanded to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of August, 1995. 
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APPENDIX 
Jerry Anderegg Affidavit 
Jerry Anderegg Affidavit 
Kirk Mower 
- dated January 13, 1992 
- dated November 5, 1992 
Affidavit 
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/ / * / " -
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK H. MOWER, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an ] 
Oklahoma corporation qualified ] 
to do business in the State of ; 
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION ] 
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corpor- ] 
ation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
• AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG 
i Civil No. 910905824CV 
i Judge Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jerry Anderegg, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah and over 
the age of 21 years. 
2. I am currently licensed by the State of Utah as a 
registered insurance agent and broker. 
3. I have been an insurance agent for 18 years. 
4. I have been an insurance broker for 10 years. 
5. I have reviewed the form attached hereto as Ex. A. 
6. In my opinion as a licensed insurance broker and 
agent, an insurance broker who received Exhibit A from a potential 
client would have an obligation to purchase all of the requested 
coverages including worker's compensation coverage for that client. 
7. In the event a requested form of coverage such as 
worker's compensation was not available, a broker or agent would, 
in my opinion as a licensed agent and broker, have a duty to inform 
the client in writing that such coverage was not available and had 
not been purchased. 
8. In my opinion as a licensed insurance agent and 
broker, if any insurance agent or broker accepted money to purchase 
insurance from a client who had used Exhibit A to order the 
insurance, such agent and/or broker would have a duty to provide 
worker's compensation insurance to the client or in the alternative 
to inform the client in writing that worker's compensation 
insurance had not been purchased. 
9. In my opinion, if Kirk Mower delivered the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. to his employer for the purpose of 
ordering insurance and money was withheld from his pay to pay for 
insurance, Kirk Mower would be justified in believing he had 
purchased worker's compensation insurance. 
DATED this / r?\ day of January, 1992. 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this /^j day of 
7^ , 1992 . 
& 
Notary Pubfic i 
Salt lite ^ u M 1 B 3 ! " = ^ ^ O T i R Y PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires J 
January 24,1903 e 
State of Uth '. RESIDING IN*-^ 
A >*"> 
My Commission Expires: 
/-o??- y.i 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG (Mower v. Alexander) was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this 
following: 
day of January, 1992 to the 
George Pratt 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Terry Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
5278-019\jn 
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK H. MOWER, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an ] 
Oklahoma corporation qualified ] 
to do business in the State of ] 
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION ] 
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corpor- ; 
ation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY 
I ANDEREGG 
i Civil No. 910905824CV 
) Judge Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jerry Anderegg, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am a licensed insurance agent and broker. My 
qualifications are set forth in my previous affidavit dated January 
13, 1992 filed in this action. 
2. I have reviewed the issues in this matter and based 
upon personal knowledge and experience render the following 
opinions: 
a) Mr, Mower acted reasonably in assuming he had 
purchased Worker's Compensation insurance which would cover him for 
on the job injuries. 
b) Providing a form such as Exhibit A attached 
hereto to a layman which form provides a space to order Worker's 
Compensation coverage would, in my opinion, create in the layman a 
reasonable belief that if he checked the box for Worker's 
Compensation coverage, he had ordered such coverage and Worker's 
Compensation insurance would be provided unless he was expressly 
informed after submission of the order form that such coverage was 
not being provided. 
c) In my experience sole proprietors often include 
themselves under Worker's Compensation policies. It is my opinion 
that it is the duty of the insurance agent to inform the insurance 
carrier that the owner is to be insured as a worker. 
d) In my opinion it is the duty of the insurance 
agent to obtain from the customer all information necessary to 
effect the desired coverages. In my opinion, failure of a customer 
to volunteer information would not be a proper basis to support a 
claim that coverage was not provided due to a lack of sufficient 
information to effect the coverage. 
e) Mr. Mower acted reasonably in assuming he had 
purchased Worker's Compensation coverage. 
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f) Under the facts of this case, I believe Mr. 
Mower was justified in believing he had purchased Worker's 
Compensation coverage. 
g) In my opinion, it is the duty of the insurance 
agent to inform the customer of all steps which must be taken to 
effect coverage. 
h) In my opinion, if the insurance agent fails to 
provide information to a customer which is necessary to effect 
coverage, the agent is responsible for any failure of coverage. 
3. In my opinion, the responsibility for failure to 
order and effect Worker's Compensation coverage for Mr. Mower in 
this case rests with Lynn Transportation Company and Alexander and 
Alexander. 
DATED this day of November, 1992. 
rf 
/JERRY &NDEREGG T 7 7 j 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TCVbefore me this 5~~ day of 
November, 1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING IN: ->• ^ ' (^c^-rT^c^ T 
My Commission Expires: 
5278h 
»°Ltt 
&>:** 
r
 NC7Y\RY PL"" 'J>-
j f^Adw»Cfty;OTatt07 
My Commission Empires 
_ ^TgTfcQF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFICAVIT OF JERRY ANDEREGG (Mower v. Alexander) was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this f / ^ day of November, 1992 to 
the following: 
Andrew H. Stone 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Terry Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
'gJ^lA<^ ~\-> A >,^H 
v
-
y
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK H. MOWER, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC., an ] 
Oklahoma corporation qualified ; 
to do business in the State of 
Utah and LYNN TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY, INC., an Iowa corpor-
ation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK MOWER 
I Civil No. 910905824CV 
) Judge Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kirk H. Mower, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above named action. 
2. On April 12, 1990, I entered into a contract with 
Lynn Transportation Co., Inc. to lease my truck to them and to then 
drive the truck to transport goods for Lynn Transportation in 
interstate commerce. 
3. I was provided a form (Exhibit A) by Lynn Trans-
portation to order insurance. I filled out the form and indicated 
I wished to purchase worker's compensation insurance. 
4. I was told money to pay for the insurance would be 
withheld from my settlement checks. 
5. Money was withheld from my settlement checks to pay 
for f! insurance. " 
6. I beleived I had purchased worker's compensation 
insurance. 
7. I would not have operated the truck if I have known 
there was no worker's compensation insurance in force. 
8. I understood Lynn Transportation was acting for 
Alexander & Alexander to help me order insurance. 
9. I was injured on the job on July 28, 1990. My lower 
back was seriously injured. 
10. My doctor has told me I need a spinal fusion 
operation and will always be disabled to some degree. 
11. I do not have money to pay my attorney's costs to go 
out of state for depositions. 
12. All transactions with the defendnats in this case 
occured in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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DATED thi s 3 day of X^ ecci*. * es , 1991. 
By: M^J // /yfq^^C 
KIRK H. MOWER 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this ^ day of 
rs->7 Otr 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
2S0NOrtTKV.,^LL« 
SIC, UT E413 
,-»*•?•• cyp 1113-15-34 
^ Zz^-f 
NOTARY PySLIC 
RESIDING IN : £.L 6=««&, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK MOWER (Mower v. Alexander) was hand 
delivered, this -£ day of (jrcr^-ro?r" , 1991 to the 
following: 
George Pratt 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Terry Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
5278-006\jn 
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